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while at the level of business and political elites it may fulfil 
informal governance functions critical for regime stability and 
survival (Baez-Camargo and Ledeneva, 2017). What these 
approaches have in common are institutionalist, structuralist 
or game-theoretical underpinnings based on micro-level 
rational choice assumptions of human decision-making 
from standard economics. Conventional anti-corruption 
interventions modelled on the theoretical underpinnings of 
the prominent principal/agent model have failed to produce 
sufficient favourable anti-corruption outcomes. 
1.2 Taking Account of Social  
Dynamics and their Role in  
Spurring Corruption
Rather than following a ‘one-size-fits all’ approach aimed at 
implementing international anti-corruption ‘best practices’ 
from the Global North, we argue that anti-corruption 
interventions must be tailored to local realities in order to 
increase their likelihood for success. It is therefore necessary 
to empirically assess the socio-cultural environments 
and politico-economic contexts where anti-corruption 
interventions are to be implemented.
Contrary to some authors who merely assign socio-cultural 
traits to collective practices of corruption (Hodess et al., 
2001; Rothstein, 2011, p. 231), we propose to extend 
the conceptual scope and include behavioural drivers of 
corruption, namely those socio-cultural determinants of 
certain types of corrupt behaviours and collective practices 
that have become normalised and routinised in contexts 
where corruption is endemic, systemic and has become the 
normal state of affairs (cf. Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-Patel, 
2017). We thus argue that certain corrupt behaviours have 
become a feature during the socialisation and enculturation 
of individuals (cf. Gavelek and Kong, 2012; Hoff and Stiglitz, 
2015). As a result, they have grown to be socially embedded, 
culturally rooted and mentally engrained in the form of 
local social norms, collective imaginaries and vernacular 
knowledge. 
1 Introduction – A Behavioural Social  
Network-Centred Approach to Anti-Corruption
1.1 Traditional Approaches to  
Anti-Corruption and Rational  
Drivers of Corruption
In light of overwhelming evidence of ineffective legal, 
institutional and organisational anti-corruption interventions 
(cf. Ledeneva et al., 2017; Marquette and Peiffer, 2015; 
Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson et al., 2013), we acquiesce in 
the call by many academics and anti-corruption practitioners 
to consider local contexts and realities for implementing 
more innovative anti-corruption interventions (Haruna, 2003; 
Mette Kjaer, 2004; Rugumyamheto, 2004). This requires 
for anti-corruption interventions to be sensitised to locally 
prevailing social habits, expectations as well as cultural 
understandings and attitudes vis-à-vis corruption (Baez-
Camargo and Passas, 2017; Koni-Hoffmann and Navanit-
Patel, 2017). In line with other authors (Ledeneva et al., 
2017; Marquette and Peiffer, 2015), we argue that existing 
theoretical and conceptual models of corruption, which 
anti-corruption interventions are essentially based upon 
in terms of their programme design and theory of change, 
are not rivalling each other but should in fact be considered 
conjointly. 
Following this line of thought, corruption may be both a 
cause and consequence of accountability problems due 
to imperfect asymmetric information between an agent 
and a principal, whereby lack of oversight and ineffective 
monitoring incentivises agents to engage in corruption 
(Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). Corruption may 
at the same time be fuelled by large-scale collective action 
and coordination problems whereby an individual’s decision 
to engage in corruption hinges upon their perception of their 
close environment as uncooperative and highly corrupt, 
thereby justifying their own corrupt behaviour on the basis 
of reciprocity and simply as ‘the way things are done’ 
(Marquette and Peiffer, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson 
et al., 2013; also, Rothstein, 2013). Moreover, corruption 
may not necessarily constitute a problem per se but can 
actually offer pragmatic solutions to ordinary citizens as 
means of ‘getting things done’ (Marquette and Peiffer, 2015), 
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The difference of this fourth perspective lies in that social 
dynamics at the community-level undergird the collective 
reproduction of certain corrupt practices at the hands of 
individuals who are at the same time members of a multitude 
of social networks. In such a community setting, fixed 
preferences at the micro-level may become endogenous; 
in other words, rational cost-benefit calculations of individual 
network members can, on the one hand, be overridden 
by socio-cultural commands and group expectations in 
certain socio-cultural contexts. This is the case when people 
feel compelled to engage in corruption against their better 
judgement, out of a sense of moral obligation towards the 
group, to meet community expectations, to either gain social 
rewards or to avoid social punishments for not complying 
with informal and unwritten norms and practices. On the 
other hand, aspiring to be part of social networks may be the 
rational and pragmatic thing to do as network membership 
often comes with ‘perks’ insofar as remedy is provided to 
network members in contexts of resource scarcity and 
service delivery underperformance. In such a case, the 
benefits derived from said network membership outweigh 
the costs, or in other words, the aforementioned network 
commands and group expectations. In either case, both 
micro-level preferences and cost-benefit calculations of 
individual network member are endogenous – as they 
are attributable to the individual members’ exposure to a 
given cultural context (‘mental models’) and social fabric 
(‘sociality’). This socio-cultural environment is shaped by a 
plethora of social network dynamics and the different sets of 
social rules, expectations and beliefs they form and generate. 
Thus, central are elements of sociality and collective ways of 
thinking (‘mental models’) and their role as, what we have 
previously labelled, behavioural drivers of corruption (Baez-
Camargo, 2017; Stahl et al., 2017).1 At the very core of this 
fourth approach lie social interactions and relationships of 
social exchange in community settings expressed in the 
form of said social network dynamics.
1 The World Bank’s 2015 World Development Report proposes three 
broad principles of human decision-making: automatic thinking, social 
thinking and thinking with mental models.
This paper sheds light upon these social network dynamics 
and their problematic role in spurring petty corruption in the 
health sector in the East African context, with a focus on day-
to-day interactions between ordinary citizens and service 
seekers on one side, and low-to-mid level officials and service 
providers on the other. It also makes explicit the inherently 
ambivalent nature of social networks by laying bare the 
attitudes and motivations of network members, as well as the 
costs attached with network membership. By distinguishing 
between structural and functional properties, social network 
dynamics that account for the collective reproduction of 
network-prescribed petty corrupt practices are causally 
explained. Empirical evidence is drawn from qualitative 
research conducted in Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda in 
2016 and 2017.2 Whilst controlling for national contexts 
and local realities, a comparison of these three countries 
- which vary significantly in terms of corruption prevalence, 
scale and propensity despite sharing comparable socio-
cultural norms and practices – allows for the illustration 
of how social networks can also be potentially harnessed 
for favourable anti-corruption and social policy outcomes. 
2 The empirical findings stem from DFID-funded research on ‘Corruption, 
Social Norms and Behaviours in East Africa’. A qualitative comparative 
case study approach was applied in two regions per country and 
fieldwork research activities entailed focus group discussions, an 
ethnographic vignette-based survey, semi-structured interviews and 
participant observation. Research reports are available on https://www.
baselgovernance.org/publications/.
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2 The Prevalence of Petty Corruption in East 
Africa and the Role of Social Networks 
that bribery, favouritism (and gift-giving) or a combination 
of both are commonly encountered when accessing health 
services. This is very different in Rwanda, where services are 
mostly provided as mandated by the rules and regulations 
governing the public provision of health services in that 
country. These patterns and trends are also captured in 
the survey results below (Figure 2).  
Figure 2: Perceived prevalence of corruption in the health sector in 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.
A crucial observation is that the provision of health services 
is not regulated by formal rights and entitlements that de 
iure govern the provision of public services but instead
on the basis of informal social network relationships and 
dynamics between service seekers on one side and health 
service providers on the other. In both Tanzania and Uganda, 
social networks reproduce petty corrupt practices, although 
to differing degrees. One of the implications is that for 
medical treatment to be facilitated, it matters if the service 
user has some kind of relationship with the health provider 
and/or if the person can afford to pay a bribe. While the 
scale of petty corruption and the forms it takes differ 
across the three countries, the influence of social dynamics 
and relational networks is actually found in all of them, 
thereby, illustrating the resilience of socially-driven corrupt 
behaviours. In other words, petty and/or silent corruption 
and associated practices – including bribery, favouritisms, 
absenteeism and gift-giving – may be governed by sociality 
and in fact be a product of social dynamics and network 
relations.  
2.1 Prevalence of Petty  
Corruption in Uganda, Tanzania 
and Rwanda
The research showcases that practices of petty corruption 
are present in the health sector in Uganda, Tanzania and 
Rwanda, albeit to different degrees. In Uganda, where 
anti-corruption efforts under President Museveni continue 
to bear rather modest effects, petty corrupt practices 
are most widespread and have become endemic and 
normalised. In Tanzania, which out of the three countries 
analysed and among African countries can be considered 
a middle-performer, petty corruption has been declining as 
a result of renewed anti-corruption efforts and bold actions 
taken by the administration of President John Magufuli. 
In Rwanda, a country considered to be one of the anti-
corruption success stories and top performers in Africa, 
practices associated with petty corruption that are found 
in neighbouring Tanzania and Uganda are far less common, 
mostly due the zero-tolerance approach to corruption led 
by President Paul Kagame, which is not only characterised 
by harsh punishment and a strict law enforcement policy 
but also entails large-scale awareness raising campaigns 
aimed at sensitising the Rwandan public about the value of 
anti-corruption and integrity. These trends are corroborated 
by the latest international assessments, recent national 
corruption surveys and our own research (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Is corruption inescapable in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda?
The encounters between citizens and providers of health 
services are shaped by these broader patterns associated 
with the prevalence of petty corruption. In Uganda and to 
a lesser extent in Tanzania, research participants shared 
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connections matter greatly but to different extents. In the 
health sectors of Uganda and Tanzania, social networks 
provide pragmatic means to an end as they constitute a 
crucial safety net in the light of economic hardship and 
institutional inefficacy. As such, service seekers resort to 
their social networks to secure medical treatment. In Rwanda, 
although resorting to social networks to get treatment is not 
necessary, social networks play a pivotal part in Rwandan 
society and are highly valued. Being part of a social network 
comes with strings as it is almost a cultural imperative to 
give into network demands. This generates a great deal of 
conflict and distress among Rwandan service providers as 
they feel compelled to give preferential treatment to their 
respective network peers. 
In the three countries studied, social proximity is a key 
structural attribute and key criterion for the type of connection 
and strength of social ties between network members that 
determines the nature of a network in terms of the function 
it fulfils, and the behaviours prescribed. Depending on the 
strength of social bond/tie, social networks may indeed fulfil 
different functions. For example, close family members are 
bound by the obligation to share and contribute to group 
welfare which results in public officials being expected 
to divert resources for the benefit of the network. More 
distant acquaintances relate to each other on the basis of 
reciprocity: for a favour (for example, preferential treatment) 
received, one feels indebted and bound to return said favour 
at some point (for example, by giving a gift). In all three 
countries, social networks of family and friends make up the 
most closely knit and strongest networks, albeit to different 
degrees in terms of the functions fulfilled and behaviours 
prescribed. The most prevalent are networks of family and 
friends, that are structured by social ties based on kinship, 
friendship, solidarity and loyalty - but in each county the 
social interactions endorsed, or in other words, deemed 
acceptable and unacceptable do indeed, vary. 
In Rwanda, where social networks of family are bound by 
strong social ties based on primordial notions of kinship, 
solidarity and loyalty - family relations and close friendships 
are collectively praised the most. Therefore, helping a family 
2.2 Social Networks and  
their Structural and Functional  
Attributes
A social network is simply defined as a network or group of 
people characterised by social ties and patterns of social 
interactions which make up the structure of a network (cf. 
Newman, 2010, Chapter 1, p.6). This means that a specific 
social network may be structured by distinct social ties 
and prescribe specific social relationships and interactions 
that characterise the pattern of social organisation within 
said network. Therefore, there may be different levels of 
social organisation within and between social networks 
depending on the type of social ties and the prescribed social 
interactions. In a given social system such as a society (or 
a social subsystem, such as a community), the structure 
of social networks thus affects the behaviours prescribed, 
the functions performed, and the type of social influence 
exerted on individual decision-making. A major driver of 
social influence is social support, and social networks 
themselves can be conceptualised as sources of different 
types of social support (Latkin and Knowlton, 2015, p. 5). 
The distinction is made between structural and functional 
support with the former referring to the extent of network 
connectedness and social integration (for example, the type 
and number of social ties) and the latter comprising the 
specific social network functions provided (Wills and Shinar, 
2000).3 We henceforth distinguish between structural and 
functional network attributes or properties. Thus, the former 
are those attributes and properties that ‘make up a network’, 
the latter refer to what networks ‘deliver’.
This can be illustrated with the following example: we 
have learnt that across the three countries social network 
3 According to this strand of literature, social networks may, for example, 
provide functional support insofar as they may fulfil an emotional 
and social function (as a locus of socialisation and a source of group 
belonging), and/or else play an instrumental or informational role and 
function (for example, a specific network one can resort to in moments 
of need to pool resources and/or gather critical information).
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member or close friend out in their moments of need is an 
imperative, to such an extent that the petty corrupt practice 
of favouritism among health care providers persists and 
is even perpetuated, despite the high repercussions and 
severe punishments one could face. Family and friendship 
networks in Rwanda simultaneously fulfil social and 
pragmatic functions. 
In Tanzania, social networks are not constrained to close 
family, kinship and very close friendship ties like in Rwanda, 
but slightly more loosely defined but still strong enough 
to provide an informal rule book prescribing practices 
associated with petty corruption. For example, for bribery 
and favouritism in the health sector to occur, it is usually 
necessary that the involving parties are either distantly 
related to each other, or have been acquainted with each 
other by a ‘mutual friend’ acting as a middle man. For 
example, a friend may introduce his relative who needs 
urgent health care to a friend and service provider willing 
to grant preferential treatment in exchange for a ‘little 
something’. Thus, in Tanzania social networks are defined 
a little more loosely in terms of social proximity and they 
fulfil an inherently pragmatic function in the health sector.
 
In Uganda, where corruption is virtually everywhere, networks 
of family and friends themselves are not necessarily void of 
corruption as they are rather weakly defined among younger 
Ugandans. Older research participants who appraise social 
networks more strongly, repeatedly lament the fact that 
nowadays, a family or friendship tie would not necessarily 
shield one from falling victim to within-network corruption 
and would not guarantee the informal provision of a public 
service. While social networks can still be a source of social 
support and fulfil both social and pragmatic functions, it is 
not only kinship and friendship that determines the strength 
and functions of networks, but apparently also the age of 
network members and their respective individual personal 
agendas and incentives. For older Ugandans, family networks 
should provide both pragmatic means and instil solidarity, 
whereas for some younger Ugandans, they seem to play a 
rather pragmatic role up to the point where within-network 
corruption is seen as a source of extra income for some. 
Other structural network properties regulating the extent of 
network connectedness are socio-economic variables, such 
as age, social status and standing.4 Furthermore, there are 
certain primordial cultural values and social norms, such as 
kinship loyalty, communal solidarity, culturally mandated 
reciprocity and obligation to contribute group welfare that 
govern the social organisation and relationships of networks 
– including the rules of informal social exchange. The latter 
are engrained in local socio-cultural structures and collective 
ways of thinking which are associated with social values 
and cultural imperatives. Following Hoff and Stiglitz (2015), 
these could be labelled socio-cultural determinants of human 
decision-making, or in this case, corrupt behaviour. 
As subsequently illustrated in the next sections discussing 
the empirical evidence, the research indeed shows that 
social networks comprise both structural and functional 
attributes. These network properties may motivate and 
induce individuals to join and be part of a network in the first 
place. We will showcase how social network properties have 
a significant influence on the provision of health services 
in East Africa. One could argue that the fact that an entire 
social system, such as a society, is highly affected by 
corruption may be attributable to the prevailing structures 
of different social networks within said society. In such case, 
the network-prescribed social interactions and relationships 
that govern corrupt transactions in the public sector, such 
as the health sector, may have become routinised and 
normalised. In the eyes of many, the functional nature of 
social networks and the ends at which they aim justify 
the means. Arguably, this may account for an increase in 
tolerability and social acceptability of corruption. This is 
to show how the aforementioned network dynamics may 
indeed perpetuate corruption by means of collectivisation 
of associated corrupt practices. The good news is, as we 
shall argue, is that social networks are potentially powerful 
anti-corruption tools, if steered and harnessed for favourable 
anti-corruption outcomes. 
4 Social standing, status and wealth may also be a pragmatic function 
that a network seeks to pursue. 
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3 Structure and Functions of Informal Social 
Networks in Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda
3.1 Network Structures,  
Social Norms and Enforcement 
Mechanisms
As previously denoted, social proximity is thus a key 
structural property that governs the working of social 
networks. The research takes note of two groups that are 
characterised by a high social proximity between them: 
the first is the family, which is considered to be the most 
important and trusted social group of relations. Friends and 
acquaintances make up the second most significant social 
network group. Informal networks can also be constructed 
on the basis of more specific criteria of group affiliation, such 
as gender, ethnicity or religion. Moreover, social networks 
can also be found at the workplace, such as horizontally 
between colleagues and vertically between superiors and 
frontline officers. It is significant that all these relations are 
found not to be static, but rather fluid and at times even 
instrumental, whereby networks develop on the basis of 
‘relatives of friends’ and ‘friend of friends’. This fluidity of 
network membership criteria means that even kinship ties 
can be manipulated instrumentally and opportunistically as 
evidenced from research on social networks in Kyrgyzstan 
(Aksana, 2018: 12). 
Furthermore, the social networks observed in the research 
are strongly underpinned by social values and norms that 
shape and give meaning to each particular interaction. A 
crucial social norm is found with regards to family relations 
as research participants agree that sharing with your next of 
kin and contributing to group welfare is socially commanded. 
In practice, this means that family members are expected 
to take care and support each other, which is considered 
an ‘essential, unquestionable premise of social life in the 
three countries’. In the context of service provision, the 
prominent value given to family and kinship accounts for 
stringent expectations towards single family members who 
hold a public-sector job and who are expected to use the 
access to resources stemming from their positions for the 
benefit of the family. This is vividly explained by a health 
sector district official in Tanzania who commented: “it’s 
not that we have a lot of money to help five or six relatives, 
but […] whatever you get you share with others.” Another 
service provider complemented this assertion by explaining 
the underlying principle as follows: “you will help that person 
because it’s your blood.” Health facility staff in Kampala 
similarly shared the expectation that family always comes 
first by explaining that “your relative must be given priority 
if there is not an emergency, my mother, father, son or 
daughter come first.” The importance of strong family 
ties can translate into common proverbs as exemplified 
in Rwanda: utagira nyirasenge arisenga [whoever does not 
have an aunt slips in isolation] or urukwavu rukuze rwonka 
abana [the old rabbit is taken care of by its children]. The 
social expectation that members of the network should share 
their income and resources with each other encourages 
practices of favouritism in the provision of health services. 
These pressures on the public service provider can be 
so stringent that in cases when the salary is considered 
insufficient to satisfy the additional needs of the network, 
it may necessitate the provider to use more extortive 
modalities such as bribing or embezzlement in the practice 
of the office. The implication is that the degree of network 
proximity becomes a strong determinant of the quality of 
treatment received.  
With regards to the core networks composed of friends and 
other acquaintances, another important social norm or value 
observed is the obligation to reciprocate gifts and favours 
received. These engagements reflect more of a transaction-
based relationship of indebtedness and entitlement between 
the giver and receiver of services. A research participant 
in Tanzania explains this logic as follows: “There is a 
reciprocal relationship meaning today you have helped me, 
so tomorrow I must find a way to return the favour.” When 
such social norms on reciprocity are transposed to the public 
service, it translates into practices of gift-giving and bribery 
because services rendered are seen as favours rather than 
entitlements. For instance, the duty to honour one’s debt 
justifies the behaviour of service providers when they request 
“takrima” (a favour or hospitality) for services provided in the 
case of Tanzania. Similarly, in Rwanda, research participants 
share that bribes are more likely to occur in instances where 
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the service provider and user are friends. These transactions 
involving a favour or a gift can be replicated and sustained 
through time as evidenced in the case of Uganda.
All network members aim to adhere to these social norms 
and values as they are reinforced by means of social rules 
and controls associated with status and respect. This 
means for instance that a service provider that rejects a gift 
offered by a user is considered disrespectful in the Ugandan 
context. In Tanzania, research participants share that service 
providers that consistently fail to provide preferential 
treatment to relatives will destroy their social standing. 
Likewise, in Rwanda, research participants explain that such 
a bad reputation can even “travel” and as a consequence 
the service provider involved might lose friends and be 
scorned by extended family members. A research participant 
from Kigali succinctly explains this as follows: “No one can 
ignore the importance [that] Rwandan people attach to 
relationships and [there are] consequences associated with 
not serving the neighbour or one of your family members, 
even when the situation does not allow [you to do so].” 
Group expectations and obligations are thus collectively 
reinforced by means of peer pressure, social sanctions and 
morally upheld by informal rules of reciprocity and kinship 
solidarity. In the African context, reciprocity is considered 
to be socio-culturally anchored in tribal affinity, pre-colonial 
community values and associated with social norms of more 
collectivist societies (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006; 
Ekeh, 1975; Sardan, 1999).  The entrenchment of these 
norms is evident in the case of Rwanda, where in spite of the 
strict legal enforcement of anti-corruption laws, individuals 
still feel bound by social obligations. 
In sum, social proximity (sociality) and the socio-cultural 
norms and values of communal solidarity and group 
welfare as a common good, as well as culturally mandated 
reciprocity and mutual obligation, and lastly social status 
and respect could all be summarised under the umbrella 
term of structural network properties as they characterise 
the make-up and workings of social networks.
3.2 Social Networks Function as 
Problem-Solving Resources 
Social networks are valued and preeminent when they 
represent problem-solving resources. The primary functional 
attribute of the network is their use as informal social safety 
nets on which members can rely on in order to access 
public health services.  While social networks have this 
instrumental role across the three countries, the manner 
in which this is exercised depends on the accessibility of 
health services. The consensus among research participants 
in Uganda and Tanzania is that while health services are 
governed by formal rights and entitlements, in practice it 
is very difficult to exercise these provisions. In contrast, in 
Rwanda, research participants share that health services 
are provided according to the formal legal stipulations. 
Consequently, in Uganda and Tanzania, citizens often rely 
on their social network to obtain access to health services 
and consider this the only way to “get things done”. In this 
context of constrained access to health services, research 
participants in Kampala view favouritism in the health 
service not as corruption or bribery but simply as “using 
one’s networks and connections to get what one wants.” 
Similarly, in Tanzania, the research informs that service 
providers can even ask friends for bribes. This is seen as 
something normal as it simply concerns a fee to receive a 
quicker service. Thus, bribing has an instrumental intent 
and offers ordinary citizens ways in which they can solve 
the problems they face when accessing services. Therefore, 
citizens resort to their social network in an effort to obtain 
a “simplified” service delivery by for instance relying on or 
establishing a personal connection with a service provider 
to receive preferential treatment and exchanging a bribe 
or a gift to make the transaction a fair one. The situation 
is different in the case of Rwanda where social networks 
can be used to expedite health services but this form of 
favouritism is mostly circumscribed to family members and 
close friends only. 
The functional attributes of the social network invoke that 
members find it is useful to build and extend it. Viewed this 
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3.3 Informal Practices of the  
Network Function to Increase  
Social Justice 
The informal practices of the network are justified because 
they increase social justice among members. Communal 
and group solidarity is a powerful form of social currency 
that network members can resort to, because strong social 
ties reduce uncertainty and increase the ability to access 
health services. Consequently, a major transgression of this 
form of social justice occurs when members are considered 
to be indifferent to the needs of their network. An example 
of this is acting out of greed – such as demanding a bribe 
in a desperate situation (i.e. refusing to treat a person that 
is in critical condition) or requesting an unreasonably high 
bribe. Bribes motivated by this kind of greedy behaviour are 
understood as not sharing with the group in the context of 
Uganda. Similarly, in Tanzania, it is considered important 
to act with generosity. Continuously asking for bribes is 
considered selfish behaviour that stands in stark contrast 
with the communitarian beneficial purpose.
The implication is that social justice follows from behaviours 
by which members show compassion and solidarity with 
one another, particularly, when problems are resolved and/
or resources are acquired to be shared among network 
members. These ideas are intimately tied to attitudes of 
tolerability and social acceptability of corrupt behaviours. 
Consequently, research participants In Kampala explain that 
the consequences of engaging in corrupt acts are: “to get 
very rich and wealthy and hence admired by the masses”, “to 
be popular, a celebrity and [thus] respected” and to “become 
an investor and employ other people”. Likewise, in Tanzania, 
the research evidence suggests that service providers that 
are open to receiving bribes or gifts or extend preferential 
treatment pleases people as explained by a participant as
follows: “society will love him and even recommend people 
to him for fast services and “people will try to build good 
relationships with him and he would be respected and gain 
prestige.” This is also closely associated with social status 
as the service provider is acting with compassion and sharing 
way, social networks represent a form of social capital that 
its members can rely on through the bonds that bind one 
another in the network. Expanding the network is achievable 
by creating personal links and relationships with the service 
provider based on bribes and gifts as is noted in Uganda 
and Tanzania. In Uganda, the research evidence shows 
that bribing is understood as a way in which a citizen can 
create a relationship with a service provider. This informal 
action co-opts the official into the personal network of the 
bribe giver. Extending the network beyond the family in 
the context of Tanzania involves developing relationships 
on the basis of reciprocity, whereby gifts can be used as 
a way to establish a personal link to the provider. This 
investment in the public official comes with the expectation 
and prospect of receiving future priority services. Even more 
strategic efforts entail the practice of developing personal 
connections with powerful and high-ranking persons. An 
illustrative example comes from Rwanda, where research 
participants share that district authorities or ranking officers 
of law enforcement agencies sometimes obtain preferential 
treatment at public health facilities. While on the one hand 
this can be interpreted as showing respect for the authority, 
it can also be associated with the desire to build a personal 
relationship with these influential persons as explained by 
the participant: “this favour towards authority may yield 
some benefit in the future, you never know!”.
Thus, social networks function as informal social safety nets 
that help cope with resource scarcity and consequently 
drives citizens to further extend it. The network-prescribed 
practices have a significant exponential effect as the logic of 
reciprocating bribes, gifts and favours received represent a 
cycle of being entitled to something or indebted to someone; 
thereby resulting in the continuation of corrupt practices. 
Moreover, such practices favour those that are part of 
the ‘in-group’ or have the financial means to build up the 
necessary network, which, in the cases of Uganda and 
Tanzania, ultimately account for a regressive health service.
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and supporting members of their network. Being 
recommended across networks can potentially create 
many informal clients and consequently increase the 
official’s social status, power and supplement low salaries. 
Nevertheless, service providers also express concerns about 
the overwhelming responsibilities and expectations that 
come with network membership.
Thus, the research indicates that citizens rely on family, 
friends and other extended relations as a pragmatic way 
to access health services and accordingly aim to build 
strategic new social relationships. The informal practices 
associated with the networks are justified because they 
promote social justice and fulfil the communitarian values of 
solidarity and fairness. It is these functional drivers, namely, 
the pragmatic ends they fulfil and the manner in which 
these are morally evaluated as being just associated with 
the social networks that spur the propensity of individuals 
to engage in corruption.
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4.1 Ambivalence of Corrupt  
Behaviours
It is the structural and functional network properties that 
as key sources of social support spur collective practices 
of petty corruption in Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda. 
This is a direct result of informal social dynamics which 
penetrate the seemingly ‘formal’ space of the public sector. 
The consequence of the superposition of informal rules 
and expectations over formal entitlements endows the 
behaviours of citizens and public officials alike with a great 
deal of ambivalence. Ambivalence arises when the formal 
rules dictating the provision of health services based on 
official qualifications and entitlements clash with social 
network expectations that are guided by more personalistic 
criteria. This distance between the formal and social 
normative frameworks leads to decision-making based 
on double standards where, often, it is considered more 
important to give into the needs of the network rather than 
abiding by the formal rules and duties of the office. This is 
morally justified because the research evidence suggests 
that the legal rules are viewed as unjust, whereas, network-
based reciprocity promotes social fairness. The gap between 
these standards is most significant in Uganda and Tanzania. 
The fact that helping family or friends is considered a way 
of promoting social fairness in contrast to adhering to the 
formal rules of the office further adds to this ambivalence. 
This results in significant pressures and expectations being 
placed on public service officials to ensure that benefits are 
secured for the network. In the particular case of Tanzania, 
the stricter anti-corruption law enforcement under the 
new administration further complicates network-induced 
corrupt exchange, as the discretionary space to give into 
social demands is decreasing. Service providers testify that 
it is becoming very difficult to meet social expectations. 
Thus, while on the one hand networks perform crucial 
functional roles as informal social safety nets and promote 
social justice among its members, it simultaneously locks 
all the members in ever expanding social responsibilities. 
Interestingly, it is the Rwandan case which shows how this 
tension in the formality-informality gap can be addressed and 
even harnessed in favour of better anti-corruption outcomes. 
4 The Ambivalent and Two-Edged Nature 
of Social Networks as an Entry Point for 
Anti-Corruption 
4.2 Social Networks are  
Two-Edged
Contrary to Uganda and Tanzania, practices of petty 
corruption in Rwanda are much more limited and mainly 
exhibited in the form of favouritism among family members. 
This achievement can be attributed to the government’s 
holistic approach towards anti-corruption; focusing on 
the legal framework and the adoption of programmes 
that formalise social practices of community welfare. In 
regards to the former, the government has adopted a zero-
tolerance approach to anti-corruption; the law is enforced 
and individuals caught face harsh punishments. This is 
complemented by an important behavioural component; 
following a corruption conviction, the names of corrupt 
perpetrators are publicised, alongside the names of their 
parents and communities of origin (“naming and shaming” 
approach). Various monitoring and evaluation strategies 
accompany this legal approach and aim to improve the 
quality and reduce opportunities for corruption in the 
public service. The research evidence shows that these 
sanctions are credible as research participants inform that 
bad performance is regularly detected and punished. The 
government also relies on more specific policy strategies 
for curbing petty corruption in the health sector, such as 
electronic queuing systems and the establishment of quality 
assurance and customer care units in health facilities. 
The Home Grown Solutions is the umbrella term for all those 
“made in Rwanda” policies and programmes that incorporate 
traditional values into formal government strategies. These 
social policies include important behavioural anchors that aim 
to restore national identity and the notion of ‘Rwandanness’ 
in order to revive traditional values of integrity and honesty. 
The Ubudehe social programme categorises citizens by 
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income level, thereby providing targeted support to the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups to access health 
services. Virtues associated with being a ‘good Rwandan’ are 
promoted through the Imihigo performance contracts, which 
comprise annual goals set for each community, whereby 
over-performers including the community of origin are 
socially and monetarily rewarded. Values of anti-corruption 
and integrity are fostered through Itorero and Ingando; 
the permanent schools for the promotion of a culture of 
excellence. Social justice, accountability and integrity norms 
instilled through these programmes are further reinforced 
via environmental cues, including the public display of codes 
of conduct and messages that confirm desirable behaviours 
in pursuit of the public good.
The research evidence from Rwanda shows that while social 
networks may offer resources to their members, relying 
on them can be risky as being caught engaging in corrupt 
actions can have grave implications for the entire network. 
This suggests that social networks can also help reduce 
corruption by reconstructing the notion of what it means to 
take care of each other (namely by not engaging in corrupt 
actions) and consequently redefining social status on the 
basis of integrity and actions that promote the public good. 
4.3 Implications for Anti- 
Corruption 
The three countries show considerable variation in terms 
of anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms set in place 
as well as the prevailing socio-economic context conditions 
which influence state and institutional efficacy and service 
delivery performance. The Rwandan case demonstrates 
that strong and credible anti-corruption oversight and 
monitoring institutions play a significant role in deterring 
corrupt behaviour, as incentives of both service seekers 
and providers are shaped to a great extent by a fear of legal 
punishments but also social repercussions. Furthermore, the 
comparison reasserts that attitudes and the proclivities vis-
à-vis corruption are partly determined by socio-economic 
precariousness and negligent public service performance 
which drives highly pragmatic individuals to strategically 
engage in corruption to ‘get things done’. In Rwanda, the 
local populace does not have to find creative ways to access 
public services as they are accessible for all and smoothly 
provided, thereby critically reducing the functional value. 
Indeed, in cases where the state is not able to provide quality 
and easily accessible public services– bribery, favouritism 
and gift-giving fulfil a crucial pragmatic function. This is 
the case in Uganda – and, to a lesser extent in Tanzania, 
where petty corruption has become an essential feature 
of day-to-day transactions in public service delivery and 
highly pragmatic individuals justify their individual corrupt 
behaviour as they perceive corruption to be the default norm.
The research shows that peer pressure and group expectations 
of the network can in fact override individual incentives 
given by the formal rules especially, as the imposed social 
costs outweigh personal benefits. The social considerations 
are also predominant when there is weak enforceability of 
the formal rules, as Rwanda and the changing situation in 
Tanzania illustrate. Both of these factors account for the 
collective reproduction of social practices and norms of 
petty corruption. Nevertheless, Rwanda and increasingly 
Tanzania illustrate that increased oversight goes a long way 
in curtailing the prevalence of petty corruption associated 
with social networks. Moreover, insights from Rwanda give 
a first glance at the double-edged nature of informal social 
networks and how they can be utilised as policy entry-
points for anti-corruption. Precisely this important role 
networks have in the lives of citizens makes them critical 
to be considered for designing innovative anti-corruption 
interventions.
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5.1 The Adoption of Network- 
Driven Approaches from the Field 
of Behavioural Public Health 
In behavioural science, community-level behavioural change 
can be achieved by following different social influence 
strategies. This hinges on the intervention’s main goals, 
the problem to be tackled given a certain context, and the
postulated underlying theoretical assumptions for programme 
change to attain such goals. Such an intervention may 
seek to change individual-level perceptions and attitudes, 
community-level behaviours and practices, and/or attempt 
to reach as many individuals from the population as possible. 
While the latter is mostly achieved through mass educational 
and media campaigns, the former two strategies rely 
predominantly on peer pressure (cf. Palluck, 2012; 2016). A 
network-driven intervention thus stipulates the power of peer 
influence and has two main tenets that can lead to positive 
anti-corruption outcomes: social diffusion (to disseminate 
information and new attitudinal and behavioural trends), and 
social norms change. Experimental research from the field of 
behavioural public health has indeed documented sustained 
behavioural effects of network-driven interventions (Latkin 
and Knowlton, 2015).5
Roughly speaking, there are two main types of network 
or ‘peer-driven’ interventions: (1) an ‘egocentric’ network-
driven intervention, which seeks to tackle a specific high-risk 
behaviour among a strategically relevant personal network 
of closely-knit individuals as the target population; and (2) 
interventions of ‘sociometric’ networks, defined as a set of 
individuals bound together by specific ties in a given setting, 
where the target population is more loosely defined. Both 
intervention types harness the power of social ties and rely 
on social referents with social credentials – peer educators, 
community opinion leaders, or trendsetters – to act as 
agents of change. They differ in that the first type targets 
sharing rituals and collective norms of reciprocity that stir a 
network-prescribed behaviour or practice of high risk, mainly 
5 Consult this reference for a critical review.
5 Network-Driven Anti-Corruption 
Interventions 
by reducing functionality.6 At the core of such interventions 
lie the social organisation and regulation of said practices 
in contexts where the network provides critical practical 
and emotional support to balance hardship by means of 
communal solidarity and socio-economic exchange.7 The 
second type of sociometric network-driven intervention 
seeks to change behavioural climates and patterns following 
one or a combination of the following strategies: 1) social 
diffusion through behavioural spill-overs and cascade effects, 
whereby critical information and even critical products (for 
example, medicines) are disseminated and behavioural 
trends emulated and adopted; or/and 2) social norms 
change.8
For example, an egocentric anti-corruption campaign could 
tackle the high-risk corruption practices perpetuated by 
vertical informal networks of corruption at the workplace. 
In Uganda, health care providers feel compelled to succumb 
to peer pressure exerted by vertically and hierarchically 
organised corruption networks at health care facilities. Peer 
pressure including social stigmatisation on one side and 
economic hardship on the other often drive individual health 
care providers to participate in the corruption schemes 
6 The concept and methodology of ‘peer-driven intervention’ was first 
developed in the 1990s as an alternative to provider-client outreach 
models, to prevent the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV 
(Broadhead et al., 1998, also Grund, 1993).
7 The mutual exchange of support in network settings hinges on an 
individual’s perception of fellow network members as being cooperative 
and supportive (Mitchell et al., 2014), alluding to the potential risks due 
to collective action and free rider problems (Mani et al., 2013).
8 Relevant studies include Paluck (et al., 2016), Paluck and Shepherd 
(2012) and Kim (et al., 2015). According to those studies, for a 
collective social norm to change, it is proposed that individual-level 
normative attitudes must change first (i.e. their positive beliefs about a 
maladaptive practice), followed by normative attitudinal change of the 
group which then translates into factual collective behavioural change 
(Bicchieri, 2017; Mackie et al., 2015; Paluck, 2009). Alternatively, 
individuals as social animals are said to more likely change their 
normative attitudes if they perceive their peers to be undergoing 
normative and factual change (ibid).
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dictated by these networks, whereby almost all health 
workers and providers engage in collusive behaviours. 
Network members derive a functional and practical value 
from their membership as they gain direct economic and/
or material benefits. Informal rules, including rewards for 
compliance and punishments for non-compliance, regulate 
this type of socio-economic exchange based on reciprocity, 
group rank and discipline. While simultaneously reducing 
the functionality of corruption by means of institutional 
and organisational reforms, an egocentric intervention 
could be aimed at singling out mid- to high-level members 
of such network and peers, who are willing to break with 
these corruption schemes and rituals, and convince fellow 
members to ‘change their ways’ by raising awareness of 
the detriments of corruption and diffusing new attitudes 
and behaviours for emulation. 
A sociometric anti-corruption campaign on the other hand 
would encompass targeting a broader target population, for 
example a whole community, and diffuse critical information 
and new normative trends in the same manner through well
respected community members of high social standing. In 
this case, no particular high-risk corrupt practice is targeted 
exclusively within an informal network that prescribes and 
reproduces such practices, but corruption is publicised 
more generally, again by means of diffusing critical anti-
corruption information and setting more integer behavioural 
attitudes and trends. Unlike an egocentric intervention, 
the communal and social network properties are used for 
geometric recruitment whereby more trendsetters, opinion
leaders and social referents are mobilised to further ‘spread 
the word’ and reach as many community members as 
possible.
Before designing a network-driven intervention, we need 
to understand how sociality, namely social influences, 
processes and organisations, promote behavioural trends 
and how aspects of social support, exchange and influence 
could be utilised to sustain behavioural change. Our study 
has yielded important insights into network inventories, 
including locally-specific factors and critical context 
conditions that are linked to positive and negative anti-
corruption outcomes. Furthermore, we have been able to 
gather critical information about structural and functional 
network properties that tell us something about the stability 
and frequency of network-prescribed interactions (notably, 
the strength of social ties, the type and level of social support 
provided and the potential for within-network interpersonal 
conflict).
5.2 Critical Network Properties 
and Context Conditions
Network properties that are critical include social norms 
of reciprocity, which are prevalent in the three countries. 
Reciprocity is not only a source of strain and ambivalence 
– but directly facilitates corrupt exchange, whereby a 
vicious circle of corruption is reinforced. It is here where 
conventional anti-corruption efforts and reforms are 
essentially undermined by the ‘negative-feedback loops’ 
diffused among ordinary citizens. The root problems to be 
addressed are not only faulty collective action out of ‘rational 
irrationality’ (cf. Cassidy, 2009),9 but also enculturated 
aspects of sociality and social norms themselves. A network-
driven intervention could work through social norms of 
reciprocity by diffusing positive feedback and new normative 
attitudes. This could lead the way to promoting change in 
conventional wisdoms of corruption, reassessing the value 
and consequences of certain socio-cultural practices and 
ultimately decreasing their functionality. We have seen that 
context matters, whereby a network-driven intervention is 
more likely to provide remedy in contexts where a minimum 
degree of state efficacy and institutional oversight are 
given. Otherwise, corruption will continue to fulfil its highly 
pragmatic function.  
Social networks should be stable, as more static network 
structures are more likely to lead to cooperation and much 
9 People tend not to take into consideration the long-term aggregated 
negative effects [of corruption for society] as a whole (ibid.).
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Following this line of reasoning, a network-driven 
intervention may be more challenging to implement in 
Uganda, where corruption as a social norm has reached 
endemic levels. Furthermore, social networks are rather 
fluid and therefore more prone to within-network corruption 
and more susceptible to free rider, collective action and 
coordination problems. The aforementioned vertically 
organised corruption networks could constitute a promising 
avenue for an egocentric peer-driven intervention in Uganda, 
provided they are accompanied by efforts to reduce 
economic hardship in the country. 
5.4 Proposing a Logic Model and  
Theory of Change for Network- 
Driven Interventions
The discussion above points to the centrality of influential 
and highly connected individuals to act as social referents 
who can promote the diffusion of critical information, as well 
as new normative and behavioural trends. For that matter, 
we propose to follow an “ITMC logic model” presupposing 
the following theory of change: 
• During the ‘inception’ phase (I), the local context and the 
prevalence of network factors is assessed, including the 
type and nature of locally prevailing social networks that 
are associated with petty corruption. At this stage, it is 
of utmost importance to assess the extent and degree 
of social proximity governing the different types of social 
networks in existence, and evaluate the leverage and 
strength of prevailing social norms and cultural values 
one could play on in the scope of the intervention. 
• During the ‘trendsetting’ stage (T), anti-corruption 
champions actively diffuse information that challenges 
conventional wisdoms about corruption, clarify the 
detriment of corruption at the expense of communities, 
and set new attitudinal and behavioural trends to be 
emulated. At this stage, social referents of high social 
standing enjoying a fair degree of network interconnected 
and social trust have been singled out. 
needed interaction between key co-operators, such as 
social referents (Rand et al., 2014). Low social trust and 
within-network corruption are indicative of instability of 
networks. One key indicator is social proximity and the type 
of social tie that sustains a network. The fluid character of 
some social networks may generally pose a problem as 
illustrated by the Ugandan case, where even the closest 
network of relatives and close friends is susceptible to 
uncooperative behaviour and within-network corruption. 
The Ugandan case also illustrates how socio-cultural values 
of ostentation (for example, among younger Ugandans) 
can lead to interpersonal conflicts that actually destroy 
social networks. A social influence strategy involving social 
referents acting as peer educators, opinion leaders and 
trendsetters requires for said referents to have social 
credentials and to enjoy a minimum of social trust vested 
in them by fellow network members. 
5.3 Avenues for Network-Driven 
Interventions in East Africa – a 
First Appraisal
Context conditions, as well as network properties and 
factors are most favourable in Rwanda and Tanzania 
– given the crucial changes in their government’s anti-
corruption approaches and efforts and a higher degree of 
network stability. This has opened a window of opportunity 
for behavioural interventions to be tested. In the case of 
Rwanda, where petty corruption has taken on a secretive 
and clandestine character given the harsh punishments and 
monitoring tools set in place, a network-driven intervention
could be designed to eradicate high-risk behaviour of 
favouritism and gift-giving among health workers and their 
personal networks of relatives and close friends. In Tanzania, 
on the other hand a socio-metric network intervention aimed 
at changing the social acceptability of corruption could be 
an option, while seeking to change conventional wisdoms 
of petty corrupt practices based on notions of reciprocity. 
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• During the third stage (M for ‘mobilisation’), more allies 
convinced of the anti-corruption cause are ‘mobilised’ 
and geometrically recruited (beginning from a single 
seed) from within the social network to further spread the 
word and diffuse new behavioural trends. Anti-corruption 
success stories are publicised at this point, spreading 
the feeling that change is indeed possible.
• During stage four (C for actionable ‘change’), the new 
attitudinal and behavioural trends translate into large 
scale behavioural change at the community level. 
Ideally, actionable changes that come with successful 
reforms are palpable and almost celebrated at this stage, 
significantly improving the livelihoods of many.
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Pragmatic motivations and socio-cultural norms are 
drivers related to social networks that spur the propensity 
of individuals to engage in collective practices of petty 
corruption – including bribery, favouritism and gift-giving. 
Most importantly, peer expectations and social network 
demands, but also cultural values and social norms, such 
as reciprocity, mutual obligation and group welfare, social 
status and respect are network attributes that structure 
the functioning and working of social network dynamics, 
including the perpetuation of the aforementioned corruption 
practices. While networks fulfil both pragmatic and social 
functions, these practices related to social networks are 
inherently ambivalent in nature. This is to mean, that if 
adequately steered and harnessed, the very attributes that 
grease these dynamics can be utilised for favourable anti-
corruption outcomes. This is showcased by the case study 
of Rwanda, where corrupt perpetrators are publicly shunned 
by means of ‘naming and shaming’ and where integer and 
solidary behaviour is socially rewarded. Accordingly, we 
propose that social networks can also be harnessed to 
elicit behavioural and attitudinal change for favourable anti-
corruption outcomes. In particular, contextual preconditions 
and crucial network properties should be considered when 
designing behavioural anti-corruption intervention. An ‘old’ 
key lesson learnt from this critical assessment is that anti-
corruption interventions, conventional or behavioural, are 
highly context-dependent. This suggests that intervention 
designs and their underlying theory of programme change 
should be realistic, feasible and most importantly tailored 
to local needs and circumstances. The postulated network-
centred approach to anti-corruption presents interesting 
avenues for further (experimental) research.  
6 Concluding remarks
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Abstract
Applying a novel behavioural approach to anti-corruption pres-
ents a promising but largely unexplored avenue to understand 
the seemingly entrenched nature of corruption. Behavioural ap-
proaches account for local contexts embedded into a given social 
fabric and cultural structure and acknowledge the leverage of 
socio-cultural drivers that influence the propensity of individuals 
to engage in corruption. The prevalence of behavioural drivers 
has indeed been empirically evidenced through fieldwork con-
ducted in East Africa, where strong social norms and cultural 
values sustain a plethora of social networks whose dynamics 
often spur petty corruption. With a focus on the health sector 
in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, the empirical findings from 
this research indeed corroborate the role of social networks in 
perpetuating collective practices of petty corruption – including 
bribery, favouritism and gift-giving. A comparative analysis of 
social network dynamics across the three countries showcases 
the inherently ambivalent nature of social networks. The paper 
compares social networks dynamics and related petty corrupt 
practices and brings to the fore how structural and functional 
network properties could be utilised as entry points for anti-cor-
ruption interventions. The case is made for designing a novel type 
of behavioural anti-corruption intervention whereby the power of 
social networks is harnessed to elicit behavioural and attitudinal 
change for anti-corruption outcomes. We thereby propose an 
altogether different theory of change.
